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abolition of any legislative authorization of permissible investments for cor-
porate trustees may be desirable." 5 Asserted competence and problems pecu-
liar to the corporate fiduciary have long justified separate and distinctive treat-
ment from that pertaining to the individual trustee."; Retention of the
restrictive legal lists for individuals, and reversion to the unrestrained dis-
cretion of the Massachusetts rule for corporate trustees would seem to offer
the best solution of the pioblem presented.. With the removal of all stigma
of unconformity to statutory prescription, discretion would be complete, and
such excuses for faulty investment policies nullified.' 7 To compensate for
thus extending the powers of the corporate fiduciary and insure proper pro,
tection for the beneficiaries, adequate authority already exists for imposing
upon such trustees standards of care more exacting than those required of
the individual." 8 Further, examination of trust portfolios by trained bank
and trust company examiners, analogous to that now imposed upon banking
departments, would be warranted." 9 "Prudence," although still undefinable,
may then assume new meanings for the professional antagonist of legislative
restraints.
UNACCOMPLISHED REFORMS IN PARTNERSHIP
BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE CHANDLER ACT
THE peculiar features of the tenancy in partnership have never been satis-
factorily fitted to the pattern of bankruptcy procedure in the United States.
Prodigious efforts have been devoted to modernizing the remedies for cor-
porations,' but partnerships have been clumsily adjusted to the bankruptcy
rules applicable to individuals. 2 The adjustment was not so difficult under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, for it provided that partnership assets could
115. Trust companies are thus uninhibited in Massachusetts and states relying solely
upon the prudence rule for beneficiary protection. See note 12 supra.
116. But see Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind. 643, 95 N. E. 573 (1911) raising
constitutional issues of unlawful discrimination.
117. See note 113 supra.
118. See In re Allis' Est., 191 Wis. 23, 209 N. W. 943 (1926) ; In rc Clark's Est., 136
Misc. 881, 242 N. Y. Supp. 210 (Surr. Ct. 1930), Stephenson, Accepting The Challenge
For Highest Standards In Trust Administration (1931) 53 TRUST Co. 491; (1930) 29
MIcE. L. Rzv. 125.
119. Following unfavorable publicity of lax standards disclosed in depression cases,
bank examiners extended their supervision into the hitherto largely unsupervised trust
departments. Neilan, Activities of Bank Examiners With Respect To Trust Funds (1938)
5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 462.
1. Notably § 77B, 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (1934), and its successor, Chap-
ter X, 52 STAT. 883 et seq., 11 U. S. C. §§ 501-676 (Supp. 1938).
2. The approach taken by the drafters of the Act is indicated by the words of § 5c,
52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23c (Supp. 1938) : "In other respects, so far as possible, the
partnership estate shall be administered as herein provided for other estates."
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not be administered in bankruptcy without adjudication of all the partners.3
Thus, the Act provided a satisfactory basis for the administration of firm and
individual property in one proceeding and for the subsequent discharge of
the adjudicated partners.4 But this solution of the partnership bankruptcy
problem made it unduly difficult for the court to obtain jurisdiction of an
insolvent firm. The 1898 Act removed the jurisdictional difficulty by defining
a partnership as a "person"' and allowing its adjudication in bankruptcy as
a unit separate from the partners composing it," so that a firm could be
adjudicated and its assets administered in bankruptcy without regard to
partners who could not be adjudicated because of infancy,7 insanity,8 ex:emp-
tions 9 or death.' 0
In allowing the separate adjudication of the firm, however, the 1898 Act
raised problems not present under the older Act, as to the separateness of
treatment of firm and partners for other purposes. Many of these problems
were not provided for in the Act, and unfortunately the courts approached
them unrealistically in terms of competing "theories" of the nature of a part-
3. REv. STAT. § 5121 (1875); see In re J. M. Ceballos & G_., 111 Fed. 451, 452
(D. N. J. 1908); Comment (1929) 29 COL. L. Rxv. 1134.
4. 1 CoLwER ox BAurVPTCy (14th ed. 1940) § 5.01.
5. 35 STAT. 8 38 (1909), 11 U. S. C. § 1(19) (1934). Under §4a any "person" (with
certain exceptions not relevant) may be a voluntary bankrupt. Under §4b any "natural
person except a wage earner or farmer ... may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt." An
interesting problem has arisen under these sections as to how literally the definition of a
partnership as a "person" under § 1(19) is to be taken. Is a partnership which derives
the principal part of its income from farming tW be regarded as "personally engaged in
farming" within § 1(17) so as to be exempt from involuntary adjudication under § 4h?
Despite logical difficulties, such exemption has been granted by the courts. H. D. Stilrs
Sons v. American Nat. Bank, 209 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913) ; I COLLIER oN BANx-
R,'pTcy (14th ed. 1940) 614-615, 702.
6. Section 5a, 30 ST.AT. 547 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 23a (1934). Under the 18ij7 Act,
partnerships were not adjudicated bankrupt; the trustee of the adjudicated partners drew
to himself the administration of the firm and separate estates. See In re Meyer, 93 Fed.
976, 979 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899) ; 1 COLLIER ox B.xINrir r, (14th. ed. 1940) § S.01.
7. In re Dunnigan. 95 Fed. 428 (D. 'Mass. 1899)); In re Duguid, 101) Fed. 274 (E.
D. N. C. 1900).
8. In re L. Stein & Co., 127 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904).
9. Dickas v. Barnes, 140 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) (a partnership, some of
whose members are farmers and wage-earners exempt from adjudication as involuntary
bankrupts, may nonetheless be adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt) ; In re Dixon, 18 F.
(2d) 961 (-,V. D. -Mich. 1926) (Though a wife is exempt from adjudication in banl:-
ruptcy under Michigan statutes, a partnership of which she was a member may b- de-
clared bankrupt). See 1 COLLmR ON BANYM~urrc" (14th ed. 1940) §5.10.
10. Mfeek v. Beezer, 28 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928), cert. denicd. 278 U. S. 651
(1929) ; In re Coe, 157 Fed. 308 (S. D. N. Y. 1907) ; In re We~ls, 293 Fed. 109 (S. D.
Ohio 1924). There is a conflict as to whether the estate of a deceased partner can b
held liable for partnership debts incurred after his death. Compare In re Evans, 161
Fed. 590 (N. D. Ga. 190S), with Blumer Brewing Corp. v. Mayer, 223 Wis. 540, 269
N. WV. 693 (1936). See Note (1936) 25 GEo. L. J. 1048; Comment (1903) 8 CoL. L
Rv. 391.
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nership - some affirming and some denying that a firm is for bankruptcy
purposes a self-sufficient "entity." 'I Some of the resulting conflicts of decision
as to the procedural treatment of firm and partners, where both are before
the court, have been removed by the Chandler Act.12 But the seeds of the
controversy which has wasted and misdirected the-energy of the courts for
decades remain.13
Neither of the competing theologies of partnership law is adequate in itself
to account for the actual system of administration in partnership bankruptcy.
For some purposes the firm and partners may be said to be separate. Both
have separate assets, and separate creditors; in recognition of this the Act
requires separate accounts for the two estates in a joint proceeding in bank-
ruptcy,14 and provides that firm creditors shall have first claim on firm,
individual creditors first claim on individual, assets.15 For other purposes,
the individual and firm estates bear a very close relation to each other. The
partners, and hence their creditors, have no direct claim on firm assets, but
have a right on dissolution to their share in the surplus of firm assets after
payment of firm debts; this interest may be available without direct inter-
ference of the court with the assets of the firm.16 The partners, on the other
hand, are directly liable for the firm debts-none the less because payment
from their estates is made first to their private creditors.'1 This means that
the surplus of the individual estates over individual debts is a firm asset,
within the direct power of the firm trustee ;18 it means that the assets of
11. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORI'ORATION (1929) 29-140;
Hough, Some New Aspects of Partnership Bankruptcy Under the Act of 1898 (1908)
8 CoL. L. REV. 599; Comments (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 1134, (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv.
1044, (1911) 10 MICH. L. REV. 215, (1908) 8 COL. L. REV. 391.
12. The professed aim of the Chandler Act was to provide a more workable system
of partnership bankruptcy. H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 3; SEN.
REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 3. The drafters of the Act apparently thought
this end could be attained without fundamental revision. See the list of proposed reforms
in Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 21 (hereinafter referred to as
Analysis) ; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 686-687.
13. Commentators discussing the Chandler Act have already differed over the theory
on which it is principally based. McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to A'lend
the Bankruptcy Act (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 369, 378, n. 42 (entity theory) ; Com-
ment (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 105 (aggregate theory).
14. Section 5e, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. §23e (Supp. 1938).
15. Section 5g, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23g (Supp. 1938). See UNiFoRm PAItT-
NERSHIp ACr § 40.
16. UNIFOR'M PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 25-28, 40; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) 150-168,
404. See Comment (1925) 39 HARv. L. REV. 247.
17. Gordon v. Texas Co., 119 Me. 49, 109 At. 368 (1920), In re Laughlin, 96 Fed,
589 (N. D. Iowa 1899). See Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 699 (1913); UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15.
18. Dickas v. Barnes, 140 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905); In re Sugar Valley Gin
Co., 292 Fed. 508 (N. D. Ga. 1923) ; Comment (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 1044, 1046-1047.
See In re Sanmuels & Lesser, 207 Fed. 195, 196-197 (S. D. N. Y. 1913), revld on other
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the partners must be considered in measuring firm solvency, 19 and admin-
istered or accounted for in the firm proceeding.
2-0
These basic rules of joint liability and priority on distribution, taken from
the Uniform Partnership Act and the non-statutory law of partnership, form
the foundation of the partnership system of the Bankruptcy Act. That this
involves the adoption, for different purposes and in different contexts, of hoth
the "entity" and the "aggregate" theories of partnerships, is not a reproach
to the drafters of the Act; no other course could have been taken without
revolutionizing the rules and risks long accepted as incident to the partner-
ship business unit. But the Act is not always skillful in providing machinery
adequate to enforce those rules in such a way as to achieve the efficient
administration of assets in the interests of creditors, and the new start for
debtors, which constitute the accepted aims of bankruptcy proceedings.
The question of what is a partnership for bankruptcy purposes is nci t settled
by Section 5.21 To come within the section, an individual must he shown to
be an actual partner, an organization to be an actual partnership, under the
applicable provisions of state law.- These provisions in general supply a
sufficiently workable test, though there may be difficulty in applying them
to certain organizations, like unincorporated companies, which combine fea-
tures of partnerships and corporations.2-3 On the subject of one such type of
grounds sub norn. it re Samuels, 215 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; UVo:inzt Prnrr;Er,-
sHIP AcT § 40(a) (II) (by implication).
19. Vaccaro v. Security Bank, 103 Fed. 436 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900); Fort Pitt Coal
and Coke Co. v. Diser, 239 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; In re Perihefter, 177 Fed.
299 (S. D. N. Y. 1910) ; In re Blair, 99 Fed. 76 (S. D. N. Y. 190 ); Comments (1929)
15 ST. Louis L. Rav. 209; (1908) 8 Cot. L. Ray. 391, 598; CA.im, PAnrr:..nsH1 (1933)
399. Contra: In re Everybody's Grocery & Meat farket. 173 Fed. 492 (D. Okla. 1953);
In re Mlcliurtrey & Smith, 142 Fed. 853 (W. D. Te.. 1905). These cases are based on
strict application of the entity theory and may be considered virtually overruled by
Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913).
20. Francis v. 'McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913); Armstrong v. Fisher, 224 Fed. 97
(C. C. A. 8th, 1915) ; Comment (1930) 15 ST. Louis L. Rav. 209.
21. 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23a-k (Supp. 1938) (the partnership section).
22. The cases hold that there can be no partnership by estoppel for bankruptcy p~ur-
poses. ln re Kaplan, 234 Fed. 866 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916); In re Fahey, 26 F. (2d) 332
(S. D. Tex. 1928), aff'd sub now. Fahey v. Sapio, 30 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
See 1 ComuEi ox BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 689-691; Un'on.i P.%nr:.sniP Act
§§ 16, 35.
23. Banking organizations with some of the attributes of a corporation haLve heen
adjudicated as partnerships. Burkhart v. German-American Bank, 137 Fed. 958 (S. D.
Ohio 1904); In re Bank of Crowell, 53 F. (2d) 6M2 (N. D. Tex. 1931). But unincor-
porated insurance associations have been adjudicated as unincorporated companies under
§ 4b. 36 STAT. 839 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 22b (1934) ; In re Seaboard Fire Underwriters,
137 Fed. 987 (S. D. N. Y. 1905) ; In re 'Minnesota Ins. Underwriters, 36 F. (2d) 371 (D.
Minn. 1929). Under the Chandler Act, any organization which the court determines to
be an unincorporated company may be adjudicated only as a corporation. § 1(8), 52 STArT.
840, 11 U. S. C. § 1(S) (Supp. 1938). The difficulty arises in this initial determina-
tion. No apparent distinction appears between the banking organizations which courts
1940]
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organization, however, the limited partnership, the Bankruptcy Act itself
gives specific directions. Both the powers and the liabilities of a limited
partner differ materially from those of a general partner,24 and the 1898 Act
dealt with limited partnerships as corporations. 2 5 This was not very logical.
Since the firm and partners can be separately adjudicated, the fact that tinder
the tests of state law the limited partners cannot be adjudicated as partners
should not prevent the adjudication of the firm. Limited partnerships are
essentially just general partnerships with added capital backing; they have
no distinguishing features important enough to justify different treatment.
In recognition of this fact, the Chandler Act has made limited partnerships
and their general partners subject to Section 5,21 and has provided that when-
ever the limited partners become subject, under state law, to the liability of
general partners, they also shall come within the provisions of the section."
The change is rounded out by a provision that distribution of the surplus
of firm property after payment of firm debts shall be made to the partners,
limited or general, or their estates, in the order directed by state law.2 S
The judicial controversy as to the degree of separate treatment necessary
for firm and partners because of the provision in the 1898 Act that the firm
might be separately adjudicated, raised a number of procedural problems in
the situation when the firm and some of the partners were concurrently
adjudicated. One of these was settled when the Chandler Act specifically
provided for filing a joint petition, in either voluntary or involuntary pro-
ceedings.29 A related problem arose as to the number of fees to which the
have treated as partnerships and the insurance associations treated as unincorporated com-
panies. Republic Underwriters v. Ford, 100 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). The
court's determination of the issue is important since an insurance or banking corporation
is exempt from involuntary adjudication, while a banking or insurance partnership is not.
24. A limited partner is not individually liable for firm debts; he is not the agent of
the firm; and his death does not work a dissolution of the firm. Analysis, 22.
25. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 1(6) (1934).
26. Section 5a, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23a (Supp. 1938).
27. Section 5k, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23k (Supp. 1938). Due to the fact that a
limited or special partner may be held liable as a general partner, he is said to be under a
"contingent unlimited liability." WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCoRrOR-
ATION (1929) 306. The stringency of the rules which call this liability into effect has,
however, been greatly lessened of recent years. Compare Petition of Williams, 297 Fed.
696 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924), with Giles v. Vette, 263 U. S. 553 (1924). See generally,
CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) 79-85; Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 895.
28. 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23g (Supp. 1938). See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Act
§ 40.
29. Section 5b, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23b (Supp. 1938). Under the 1898 Act
some courts had refused to adjudicate partners and partnerships on a joint petition, In re
Farley, 115 Fed. 359 (W. D. Va. 1902); In re Barden, 101 Fed. 553 (E. D. N. C. 1900).
Other courts had discharged partners on the basis of a partnership petition. In re Langs-
low et al., 98 Fed. 869 (N. D. N. Y. 1899); In re Gay, 98 Fed. 870 (D. N. H. 1899).
Prior to the Chandler Act separate petitions against a partnership and its individual
members were required in Virginia, North Carolina and California; while in New I-lamp-
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bankruptcy officials were entitled. Clerks received a separate fee for each
"estate" handled;30 but the trustee and referee were allotted a fee for each
"case." 31 In courts which held that petitions of concurrently adjudicated firm
and partners should be filed jointly, the referee and trustee were therefore
sometimes confined to a single fee.32 The Chandler Act now provides that
a trustee shall receive a fee for each "estate ;" but referees, who still receive
compensation by the "case," may find themselves limited on a joint petition
to a single fee.34
In the light of the judicial controversy over the separateness of firm and
partners, the filing of a joint petition raises further problems with regard to
the necessary allegations. Must the requirements of the Act as to the amount
of debt 33 and the number of creditors30 required for the filing of an involun-
tary petition be separately satisfied as to each of the partners joined with
the firm? If the "entity" theory is taken seriously, it would seem that they
must. But the liability of each of the partners for the firm debts seems,
realistically, to provide a sufficient basis for considering firm creditors as
individual creditors for this purpose, and firm debts as individual debts. The
case authority seems to indicate that the more practical standard will be
followed, and allegations that the firm has satisfied the requirements will
be deemed to confer jurisdiction of the joined partners as well.3 7 With regard
to venue also, separate allegations seem to be unnecessary, under the pro-
visions of subsection 5d;38 though careful practice requires that where a
partner resides in a different district, the fact should be noted, as it may be
necessary to invoke the provisions of the Act on ancillary jurisdiction."3
shire, New York, Pennsylvania and other eastern states, a joint petition wras permitted.
Analysis. 23.
30. 30 STAT. 559 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 80a (1934).
31. 30 STAT. 556 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §68a (1934) (referee); 36 STAT. 840 (1910),
11 U. S. C. § 76a (1934) (trustee).
32. On the theory that a joint proceeding .vas only one case, regardless of how many
estates were involved. Willis v. Hart, 11 F. (2d) 530 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) ; In re Langs-
low. 98 Fed. 869 (N. D. N. Y. 1899); In re City Contracting and Building Co., 30 Am.
B. R. 133 (D. Hawaii 1913). Other courts, however, had awarded fees for each estate
to referee and trustee. In re Wenz, 30 F. (2d) 705 (M. D. Penn. 1929); In re Thomp-
son, 17 F. (2d) 601 (D. N. H. 1927); In re Barden, 101 Fed. 553 (E. D. N. C. 1909)
(each "case" means each "estate").
33. 52 STAT. 861, 11 U. S. C. § 76c (Supp. 1938).
34. See Comment (1938) 87 U. oF PA. L. REV. 105, 107.
35. Section 4b, 52 STAT. 845 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 22b (Supp. 1939) (debts must
equal or exceed $1,000).
36. Section 59b, 52 STAT. 868 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 95b (Supp. 1933) (three or more
creditors with provable claims equal to or in excess of $500; if all creditors are less than
twelve, then one creditor with provable claims equal to $500).
37. See lills v. J. H. Fisher & Co., 159 Fed. 897, 893, 900 (C. C. A 6th, 1903).
38. 52 ST.T. 845, 11 U. S. C. §23d (Supp. 1938) ; 1 COLuErn ONi BAuxMTc, (14th
ed. 1940) §§ 2.17, 5.16.
39. See 'Moona's BxArNuncy AfAiqUAL (1939) § 2.10, p. 21; § 2(20), 52 STxr. 842,
11 U. S. C. § 11(20) (Supp. 1938).
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And separate prayers for relief should be included to insure the discharge
of each of the partners. 40
For purposes of an act of bankruptcy on an involuntary petition, the firm
and partners are generally treated as separate. The underlying philosophy
of acts of bankruptcy is still that of fault. 4 x Therefore, though a partner may
provide the basis for his own adjudication and that of the firm by an act
of bankruptcy which affects the firm business or disposes of the firm assets,
42
the other partners cannot be adjudicated on the basis of the same act unless
they to some degree participated in or ratified it.43 The evidence required
for a finding of participation, however, is often slight. 44 And some cases
have gone to the extreme of holding that an act which justifies the firm
adjudication is a basis for the concurrent adjudication of all the partners.45
Even, however, where the general rule of separate allegations with regard
to acts of bankruptcy is followed, a separate allegation of the insolvency
of each partner, in cases where insolvency is an issue of the alleged act of
40. The relief granted will follow the form of the prayer. In re Anderson Motor Co.,
18 F. (2d) 1001 (N. D. Tex. 1927). In re John L. Russell, 97 Fed. 32 (N. D. Iowa 1899).
41. See Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankrilptcy
Law (1938) 52 HARV. L. REV. 189.
42. A partner committing a firm act of bankruptcy with partnership assets has been
held to commit simultaneously an individual act of bankruptcy. In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976
(C. C. A. 2d, 1899); In re Perlhefter & Shatz, 177 Fed. 299, 305 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
Contra: In re Hale, 107 Fed. 432 (E. D. N. C. 1901). Generally, the commission of an
act of bankruptcy as to partnership property by one partner within the scope of his au-
thority amounts to an act of bankruptcy by the firm. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th
ed. 1940) 696; see CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) 400. However, in case the act of bank-
ruptcy relied on is a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, an admission of in-
ability to pay debts and a willingness to be adjudicated bankrupt, or concealment of
assets with intent to defraud creditors, it is not a firm act unless the other partners have
given express authority to the acting partner or can be said to have ratified or assented
to his act. In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899) (general assignment ratified
by inaction of the non-acting partner) ; It re Kersten, 110 Fed. 929 (E. D. Wis. 1901)
(admission of inability to pay debts and willingness to be adjudicated bankrupt ratified
by other partner's failure to object). Iii rc Wellesley, 252 Fed. 854 (N. D. Cal. 1917)
(concealment of assets with intent to defraud creditors ratified because the non-acting
partners did not prevent or rectify the act).
An act of bankruptcy committed by an individual partner with the assets of his sepa-
rate estate, even when made with intent to prefer some firm creditors over others, is not
a firm act of bankruptcy. Hartman v. John Peters & Co., 146 Fed. 82 (M. D. Pa. 1906) ;
In re Stovall Grocery Co., 161 Fed. 882 (N. D. Ga. 1908). But it is an individual act of
bankruptcy by the partner for which he may be adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt.
Mills v. J. H. Fisher and Co., 159 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908); Hartman v. John
Peters & Co., supra.
43. In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976, 979 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899) ; In re Kersten, 110 Fed. 929
(E. D. Wis. 1901); 1 COLLIER Ox BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.05.
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Yungbluth v. Slipper, 185 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911), cert. denied, 223 U. S.
722 (1911) ; Holmes v. Baker & Hamilton, 160 Fed. 922 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908) ; 1 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 697, n. 9.
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bankruptcy,46 is unnecessary, 47 provided the same act is used for firn and
partners. For under the prevailing rule of firm solvency, based on the lia-
bility of each of the partners for all the firm debts, a firm is insolvent only
when none of the partners is solvent in the sense of being able to pay both
his own and the firm debts.
48
A voluntary petition is not in pursuance of, but is aimed at ending, the
firm business, so that the usual mutual agency relationship of the partners is
absent.4 9 Hence a voluntary petition in behalf of the firm must be authorized,
or at least ratified, by all the partners. 0 To make a firm adjudication possible
when some but not all the partners felt that the economic situation of the
firm made it desirable, General Order VIII was promulgated under the
46. An allegation of insolvency at the time of the commission of the act of ban!:-
ruptcy is necessary under the second, third and fifth acts, § 3a, 52 STAT. 844, 11 U. S. C.
§ 21 (Supp. 1938). Solvency is also relevant as matter of defense under § 3d. Solvency
at the time of the petition is a complete defense to the first act, under § 3c. See West Co.
v. Lea, 174 U. S. 590 (1899) ; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUITCY (14th ed. 1940) § 3. The fifth
Act allows, as an alternative to the usual solvency test in bankruptcy, an allegation of
inability to meet debts as they mature. See Chandler Act Commentary, 11 U. S. C. A.,
p. 7 (Supp. 1939).
47. See Meek v. Beezer, 28 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); 1 CorU o: B.NK-
Purc (14th ed. 1940) 705.
48. In re Blair, 99 Fed. 76 (S. D. N. Y. 1900) ; In re Griffith, 280 Fed. 878 (D.
Del. 1922-) ; In re Perley & Hays, 138 Fed. 927 (E. D. Mo. 1905); Comment (1929)
14 ST. Louis L. REv. 179; 1 REMINGToN. B.KRIuPTCY (4th ed. 1934) § 68; CnMNE, P.nr-
NERsHIP (1938) 399; 1 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1930) 693; see note 19 snpra.
The rule actually appears in the Chandler Act, though its application is there limited
solely to determining partnership insolvency in connection with liens and fraudulent trans-
fers. § 67d(1) (d), 52 STAT. 875 (1938) ; 11 U. S. C. § 107d(1) (d) (Supp. 1938). The
general bankruptcy rule is that a person is insolvent when the aggregate of his assets at a
fair valuation are insufficient to pay his debts. 52 ST.T. 840, 11 U. S. C. § 1(19) (Supp
1938). Cases adopting the entity theory in all its implications, therefore, determined
partnership insolvency without reference to the assets of the individual partners. In re
Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); In re Solomon & Carvel, 163 Fed. 492
(E. D. N. 1. 1908). The reasoning of these cases, however, shared the fate of the dodo
after Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913).
On the illogical inclusion of exempt assets in determination of partnership insolvency,
see McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bian!:rnpty Act (1937) 4
U. OF CHI. L. REv. 369, 373.
49. It re Julian, 22 F. Supp. 97 (M. D. Pa. 1938); U.NwoRm PR=TEt!SUiW Acr
§ 9(3) (c); CRA.-zE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) 398. But the filing of a "voluntary" petition
without consent of all partners may be considered an act of bankruptcy. In re Juncl: &
Balthazard, 169 Fed. 481 (E. D. NVis. 1909) ; In re Forbes, 128 Fed. 137 (D. Mass.
1904).
50. Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426 (1925) ; In re York, 18 F.
(2d) 428 (N. D. Tex. 1926) ; In re McCloskey, 18 r. (2d) 311 (E. D. Pa. 192Wi , ste
Comments (1927) 76 U. OF P.. L. Rmv. 85, (1925) 4 TF-v. L. RPv. 102. Ratification by
a nonjoining partner may be found from his failure to object. In re Sitnek, 52 F. (2d)
861 (W. D. Pa. 1931).
51. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 703. General Order VIII %%as sup-
plemented by Official Form No. 2.
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1898 Act. The order provided for a quasi-voluntary petition by less than
all the partners. Creditors could not intervene, but due notice had to be
given to the non-joined partners.52 If they objected, the petition was deemed
involuntary as to them, and they had the right to make, under some cases,
any defense open on an ordinary involuntary petition;53 under others, a
defense only on the issue of solvency.54 On failure of the defense, the ob-
jecting partners could not themselves be adjudicated, but they could not
stand in the way of the court's taking jurisdiction of the firm and the peti-
tioning partners.-5 This curious combination of a voluntary and involuntary
petition was ruled invalid when the Supreme Court in 1925 abrogated
General Order VIII."- The Court held that the procedure had no basis in
the 1898 Act, which provided for only two methods of adjudication -volun-
tary and involuntary. This method could not be termed voluntary, since
some of the partners objected; nor involuntary, since the petition was not
brought by creditors and did not allege an act of bankruptcy. The order
was therefore held an improper legislative use of the rule-making power. 7
The Chandler Act filled the procedural gap left by this case. It provided
for a petition by less than all the partners, alleging firm insolvency, s with
notice to non-assenting partners to allow them to file an answer on this issue.Y
The reform has been minimized on the ground that individual partners could
get relief from firm debts by filing an individual voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy.60 This view seems unduly harsh. The change represents a significant
departure from the philosophy underlying the requirement of an act of
bankruptcy, 61 and it provides a convenient procedure whereby full and im-
mediate administration of the firm property may be achieved when some of
the partners feel that the economic situation of the firm and its partners
requires such a course. The procedure removes, for purposes of a petition
by the partners, the difficulty in getting before the court which faced creditors
52. In re John L. Russell, 97 Fed. 32 (N. D. Iowa 1889); 1 COLLIER Oq BANIZ-
RUPTcY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.11.
53. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.11.
54. Some cases rationalized the limitation of the contested issues to solvency by de-
claring that the filing of a partnership petition amounts to a firm act of bankruptcy. In
re Forbes, 128 Fed. 137 (D. Mass. 1904) ; In re Junck & Balthazard, 169 Fed. 481 (E. D.
Wis. 1909). Another case stated that an act of bankruptcy is unnecessary. It re J. M1.
Ceballos & Co., 161 Fed. 445 (D. N. J. 1908).
55. See In re J. M. Ceballos & Co., 161 Fed. 445, 449 (D. N. J. 1908) ; In& re Junek
& Balthazard, 169 Fed. 481, 484 (E. D. Wis. 1909); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUrTCY (14th
ed. 1940) §5.11.
56. See note 51 supra.
57. Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426 (1925) ; In re Julian, 22 F.
Supp. 97 (M. D. Pa. 1938); Hunter v. Hunter & Drew el al., 8 F. Supp. 84 (W. D. La.
1934) ; see note 50 supra.
58. Section 5b.
59. Section 5b is procedurally correlated with § 18a and b. See Analysis, 23.
60. See Comment (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 105, 107.
61. See Treiman, supra note 41.
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under the rule in the 1867 Act that firm property could not be administered
without adjudication of all the partners.0 2 Like the provision of the 1898
Act allowing separate firm adjudication, it provides the supplementary ma-
chinery necessary to the solution of a problem peculiar to partnerships.
Where a partner but not the firm is in bankruptcy, a different sort of
problem is presented. Here the difficulty facing the court is in getting juris-
diction, not of the firm, but of the partner's interest in the firm. That interest
consists of the partner's share of the surplus after payment of firm debtsYe3
It is available to the bankrupt partner's trustee for the benefit of the individual
creditors, c but it is held insufficient to give the partner's trustee any right
to levy directly on the firm assets.0 0 Section 5 recognizes this limitationeG
but makes the partner's interest available to the trustee through machinery
taken from state law. Bankruptcy of a partner dissolves the firm and compels
the winding up of its affairs. 7 Section 5 therefore preserves to the non-
adjudicated partners, in the absence of waiver, the right granted them under
the Uniform Partnership Act,0 s to wind up the firm business and account
expeditiously 9 to the court for the interest of the bankrupt members.70 The
subsection conferring on the court with jurisdiction of one of the partners
jurisdiction of the administration of the firm property7 ' is therefore held to
be limited, if the firm is not itself adjudicated, to jurisdiction by consent
of the non-adjudicated partners.72
It was formerly held that this limitation prevented the discharge of the
adjudicated partner from firm debts, in view of the policy that such discharge
must be based on full administration of the firm property. 7 - The limitation
62. See p. 909 supra.
63. Uxn om PAmsmip AcT §§ 24-28.
64. See 'Marnet Oil & Gas Co. v. Staley, 218 Fed. 45, 48 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914) ; Tate
v. Brinser, 226 Fed. 878, 882 (M. D. Pa. 1915) ; In re Laughlin, 96 Fed. 589 (N. D. Iowa
1899) ; 1 CoLLmR ON BANKR PTcy (14th ed. 1940) §§ 5.19, 5.36.
65. See p. 910 supra; Amsinck v. Bean, 22 WAall. 395, 401 (U. S. 1874).
66. Section 5i, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23i (Supp. 1938) ; Armstrong v. Fisher,
224 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); 1 COLmER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 721.
67. UNiFon PART-sn AcT § 31(5).
68. Ibid.
69. See p. 918 infra.
70. Section 5i, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23i (Supp. 193S'); 1 CoLLTKM on- BAi.-
RPuTcY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.37; see UNrFoR PtR~z~ ExnsmP AcT § 37.
71. Section 5d, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23d (Supp. 1938) ; see note 81 inlra.
72. Tate v. Brinser, 226 Fed. 878 (M. D. Pa. 1915) ; Mfarnet Oil & Gas Co. v. Staley,
218 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914); see Francis v. McNeal, 106 Fed. 481, 4,3-486 (C. C. A.
3d, 1911), aff'd, 228 U. S. 695, 700-710 (1913); Chemical Nat. Bank v. Meyer, 92 Fed.
896, 898 (E. D. N. Y. 1899) ; 1 CoLLImR O= BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.36-37.
73. In re Meyers, 96 Fed. 408 (S. D. N. Y. 1899); Dodge -. Kaufman, 46 Misc.
248, 91 N. Y. Supp. 727 (Sup. Ct. 1905). Some of the cases limited the application of
the rule to the situation in which firm assets were available. In re Meyers, 97 Fed. 757
(1899). Later cases under the 1898 Act allowed discharges regardless of the e.-stence of
firm assets. New York Inst. for Deaf and Dumb v. Crockett, 117 App. Div. 269, 78-2,70,
102 N. Y. Supp. 412, 419-420 (1st Dep't 1907).
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on the power of the individual trustee to deal with the firm assets, however,
does not prevent the fulfillment of this policy, or lead to any prejudice of
individual creditors, for the non-adjudicated partners will not be allowed to
hinder the proceeding by delay, and the necessary consent to administration
by the court is not difficult to imply.7 4 If, further, the necessary prerequisites
of scheduling of firm debts, notice to firm creditors, and a proper request to
the court for appropriate relief are complied with, the statute provides no
technical objections to a discharge from firm debts.75 Such debts are provable
against the individual estate,70 and the act allows discharge from all l)rovable
debts. 77 By proving in the individual proceeding, the firm creditors are not
precluded from later pursuing their remedies against the firm and the other
partners. 78 Thus no one is prejudiced, the requirements of the statute are
met and the policy of full administration is substantially satisfied. Hence,
although of course consolidation is desirable if a firm petition is pending,
there can be no quarrel with the provision in the Chandler Act which spe-
cifically gives to an individual partner the right to a discharge from firm debts
in a separate, as well as a joint proceeding. 79
Thus, little revision of the 1898 Act was required to meet the problems
presented by the situation in which some but not all the partners were adjudi-
cated. Where, however, all the partners, but not the firm, were adjudicated,
the courts found a serious procedural gap in the statute. In such a case, there
is no longer any reason to reserve to any of the partners the right to wind
up the firm affairs; for all of them are already before the court. But the
courts were unwilling to construe the negative provision forbidding them to
take jurisdiction without the consent of non-adjudicated partners into an
affirmative grant of authority where all were adjudicated: they held that even
in this situation the individual trustees had no authority over the firm prop-
74. Consent of a non-adjudicated partner can be implied from failure to object. In re
Harris, 108 Fed. 517 (N. D. Ohio 1899) ; cf. In re Sitnek, 52 F. (2d) 861 (W. D. Pa.
1931).
75. In re Diamond, 149 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. McElwane,
107 Fed. 249 (D. Ind. 1901); In re Sugar Valley Gin Co., 292 Fed. 508 (N. D. Ga.
1923) ; Comment (1930) 15 ST. Louis L. REv. 209, 216.
76. Section 5h; In re Diamond, 149 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906) ; Gordon v, Texas
Co., 119 Me. 49, 109 Atl. 368 (1920); In re Laughlin, 96 Fed. 589 (N. D. Iowa 1899);
Note L. R. A. 1918 E 470.
77. Section 17, 52 STAT. 851, 11 U. S. C. § 35 (Supp. 1938).
78. Section 16, 30 STAT. 550, (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 34 (1934); see Jarecki Mfg. Co.
v. McElwaine, 107 Fed. 249, 251-252 (D. Ind. 1901) ; In re Kaufman, 136 Fed. 262, 265
(E. D. N. Y. 1905).
79. Section 5j, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23j (Supp. 1938). The later cases under
the 1898 Act had reached this result. In re Laughlin, 96 Fed. 589 (N. D. Iowa 1899) ;
Gordon v. Texas Co., 119 Me. 49, 109 Atl. 368 (1920) ; New York Inst. for Deaf and
Dumb v. Crockett, 117 App. Div. 269, 102 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1st Dep't 1907); 1 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.15.
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erty without a separate firm adjudication.80 There seems no reason why
the courts could not have allowed the administration of the firm property
without firm adjudication under the subsection giving the court with juris-
diction of one of the partners jurisdiction of the administration of the firm
property ;s' but the Chandler Act has now removed the difficulty and provided
the standard basis for administration by ruling that where all the partners are
adjudicated, the firm shall also be adjudicated. -2 This allows the rules for
venue and ancillary jurisdiction worked out by the courts under subsection
5d and General Order VI to be applied without procedural inconvenience.r"
The need for an automatic firm adjudication to provide a basis for the
administration of the firm property, where all the partners have been adjudi-
cated, arises from the treatment of the firm as a separate "person" for pur-
poses of adjudication. If the firm were to be treated as a "person," the courts
felt, its property should be administered only when the prerequisites to admin-
istration of the estates of individuals had been met.84 This view of the finn
as a separate "entity" has had more serious consequences in blurring the
distinction between the rights and liabilities of the partners as individuals
and as members of the firm, and has made it difficult for the court to deal
adequately in a firm proceeding with the assets of unadjudicated partners.s5
The difficulty is partly the result of faulty analysis. A firm cannot lie effec-
tively dealt with for all purposes as an "entit,."80 It can be separately adjudi-
cated a bankrupt; but that rule should be limited to its proper function of
enabling the court to take jurisdiction of the fund of assets used in the part-
nership business when some of the partners cannot be individually adjudi-
80. In re 'Mercur, 116 Fed. 655 (E. D. Pa. 1902), aff'd, 122 Fed. 384 (C. C. A. 3d,
1903); Ludowici Roofing Tile Co. v. Pennsylvania Inst. for Blind, 116 Fed. C61 (M D.
Pa. 1902) ; see Amsinck v. Bean, 22 Vall. 395, 401 (U. S. 1874) ; 1 CoL im o: BA%;x-
urwrcy (14th ed. 1940) 741, n. 1.
81. Section 5d, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. §23d (Supp. 1938). This provision is
virtually the same as that included in the 1S98 Act, § Sc, 30 STAT. 547 (1893), 11 U. S. C.
§ 23c (1934). § 5d reads: "the court of bankruptcy which has jurisdiction of one of the
general partners may have jurisdiction of all the general partners and of the administra-
tion of the partnership and individual property."
82. Section 5i, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. §23i (Supp. 1938); Analysis, 25, n. 10;
1 COLL Ox BAmKRTJPicY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.38.
83. In re Flaherty, 265 Fed. 741 (N. D. Iowa 1920), modified on other gronds
sub norn. Carter v. Whisler, 275 Fed. 743 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) (discussing venue and
ancillary jurisdiction); 1 Couaaa ox BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.16. General
Order VI and § 32, 52 STAT. 857, 11 U. S. C. § 55 (Supp. 1938) regulate transfer of
jurisdiction from one district court to another.
84. See In rc Mercur, 116 Fed. 655, 658 (E. D. Pa. 1902), aff'd, 1M2 Fed. 384, 39
(C. C. A. 3d, 1903).
85. In re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) ; In re Everybod3's Grocery
and Meat Market, 173 Fed. 492 (D. Okla. 1903) ; cf. Francis v,. MeNeal, 228 U. S. 695
(1913) ; Comments (1928) 41 Hav. L. Rnv. 1044, (1929) 29 CoL L. Rv. 1134 (1911)
10 ficii. L. REv. 215, (1908) 8 Cot. L. Ry. 391.
86. Analysis, 21; Comments (1929) 29 COL L. R v. 1134, (1929) 23 Il. L. R'. 4Q3.
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cated.8 7 Further, the firm and partners must be separately treated for purposes
of the rule of distribution,"8 incorporated into the bankruptcy act from state
law, 89 which provides that individual creditors shall have first claim on in-
dividual assets, firm creditors first claim on firm assets.90 There has been a
good .deal of criticism of this rule on the ground that, since the claim of firm
creditors to individual assets is stronger than that of individual creditors on
firm assets, it is unfair to put the two classes on a par.91 Such criticism is
not without justification. The existing rule, however, is of very long standing,
and is generally admitted to be a fairly workable, if somewhat crude com-
promise between the rights of firm and individual creditors ;92 it is readily
understandable that it should be reenacted in the Chandler Act, unchanged
except for a provision for distribution of the surplus of firm assets in the
order provided by the applicable state law. 93 It has no real exceptions 4 and
a disposition of the firm property which defeats the priorities which it estab-
lishes may be set aside as a fraudulent or preferential transfer.95
The firm and partners are also treated separately for purposes of the
trustee's accounts. 96 Because of the priority of the firm and individual credi-
87. See p. 909 supra.
88. Section 5g, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23g (Supp. 1938).
89. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 724.
90. See Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 700 (1913) ; Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio
St. 179, 181 (1857) ; CRANE, PARTNERSHIp (1938) 403 et seq.; Shroder, Distribution of
Assets of Bankrupt Partnerships and Partners (1905) 18 HARv. L. REv. 495.
91. Shroder, Distribution of Assets of Bankrupt Partnerships and Partners (1905)
18 HARV. L. Rir. 495, 504. The rule of distribution appears in the bankruptcy law of
no other country except England. Brannan, The Separate Estates of Non-Bankrupt
Partners in the Bankruptcy of a Partnership under the Bankruptcy Act of r898 (1907)
20 HARv. L. REV. 589, 592.
92. See Rodgers v. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179, 182 (1857).
93. Section 5g, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 238 (Supp. 1938). See UNIFORM PART-
NERSHIP ACT § 40, and UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 23.
94. Section 5h (§ 5g of the 1898 Act), which provides for marshaling the assets of
partnership and individual estates to ". . . secure the equitable distribution of the
property of the several estates" has been uniformly held to strengthen and execute, not
to limit, § 5g (§ 5f of the 1898 Act). See Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 686, 695, 696,
n. 48. An apparent exception to the rule of § 5g appears in cases allowing a firm creditor
who has received from a partner separate security for his debt, to share pan passu with
the partners' individual creditors. Mitchell v. Hampel, 276 U. S. 299 (1928); Bucking-
ham v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Fed. 192 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904) ; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Mead,
216 Mass. 521, 104 N. E. 377 (1914). A real exception existed in the early rule permit-
ting firm creditors to share par passo in the partners' individual estates if there were no
firm assets. Conrader v. Cohen, 121 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 3d, 1903) ; 1 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.27. The irrationality of the exception was soon exposed. In re
Wilcox, 94 Fed. 84 (D. Mass. 1899) ; In re Janes, 133 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904);
Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank of Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Bank, 240 U. S.
498 (1917).
95. Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 686.
96. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.20.
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tors to the funds on which they have primarily relied, it is of course necessary
that the firm trustee keep separate accounts of the different estates in his
charge, and the Act so provides.07 This function is generally allotted to the
firm trustee even in a joint proceeding. But because of a recognition of the
fact that there may be occasions when, because of conflict of interest or
procedural inconvenience, the best interests of the individual partners may
require separate trustees to administer the individual estates, the Act has
specifically authorized the appointment of a separate trustee for cause shown.2
3
The separate treatment of the partners for purposes of accounting and
distribution, however, is grounded, not on any mysterious separate person-
ality of the firm, but on the fact that the partners have, as individuals, rights
and liabilities distinct from those incident to their relation to the firm. The
fact that they must first pay their individual debts does not affect the fact
that they are liable for all the firm debts. D Because of that liability, the
surplus of their assets over their individual debts is a firm asset'0 0 which must
be considered in determining the question of firm solvency.'' Because of
that liability too, the firm trustee has a direct right against the individual
assets available to him, and those assets must be drawn into the firm pro-
ceeding' 2 or at least accounted for. Individual adjudication should be relevant
only to the handling of the assets allocated to the payment of individual debts;
a firm adjudication should give the firm trustee power to dispose of all rele-
vant assets, and the court power to discharge all liability for firm debts.
Unfortunately the Bankruptcy Act, in attempting to engraft the partner-
ship section on the structure already worked out for individuals, does not
adequately distinguish between the rights and liabilities of the partners inci-
dent to the firm proceeding and those incident to an individual proceeding;
and the logomachical dispute over the entity theory has made it difficult for
the courts to keep this important distinction in mind. As a result, cases under
the 1898 Act at first denied the court any power at all over the estates of
partners with respect to whom the usual basis of jurisdiction, adjudication,
was lacking. 03 The statute, when it permitted the adjudication of the firm
without that of all the partners, did not clearly provide a new basis for the
necessary action with regard to unadjudicated partners. Under Section 5c
of that Act, the court with jurisdiction of one of the partners was given
jurisdiction of the others and of the administration of the firm and separate
97. Section 5e, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23e (Supp. 1938).
98. Section 5c; Analysis, 23.
99. See Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 699 (1913); Dicms v. Barnes, 140 Fed.
849, 851 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905).
100. See note 18 supra.
101. See Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 700-703 (1913) ; note 19 sopra.
102. See note 20 supra.
103. In re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); It re Solomon & Camel,
163 Fed. 140 (E. D. N. Y. 1908) ; Comments (1908) 8 CoL L. REv. 391, (1912) 10 Mica.
L. REv. 215.
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estates.10 4 The term "jurisdiction," as first used in that section, seems clearly
referable to questions of venue and the proper forum, and the main applica-
tion of the section has been to questions of this sort.105 The problem is
therefore presented as to whether, if "jurisdiction of one of the partners"
refers to general jurisdiction of the person rather than to the presence of
the statutory prerequisites to bankruptcy action, the grant of jurisdiction
of administration contained in the second clause of the section can fairly
be interpreted as an affirmative grant of power over all the estates. The
famous case of Francis v. McNeal'"0 held that it could and that the estate
of an unadjudicated insolvent partner could be drawn into the firm proceed-
ing. In view, however, of the fact that not all acts of bankruptcy involve
an allegation of insolvency, 10 7 doubt remained as to whether this power existed
in the case of a solvent partner, 0 8 and cases reaffirming the doctrine of
separateness of firm and partners rather indicated that the rationale of the
McNeal case might be limited to its facts. 10 9 It now seems, however, that
at least in the reenactment of the subsection in the Chandler Act, a broad
view of the McNeal case was adopted and an affirmative grant of authority
was intended." 0 In the subsection authorizing the appointment of a separate
trustee,' adjudication of the individual partner is required, for procedural
reasons, as a prerequisite; but adjudication of the partners is omitted as a
requirement of administration of the separate estates by the firm trustee.
The distinction seems to have been purposive.
It seems, then, that under the Chandler Act the firm trustee has the power
to administer the estates of unadjudicated partners regardless of their indi-
vidual solvency. , 2 But even under the new Act the power is not coextensive
with the needs of adequate administration. Since the surplus of individual
assets over individual debts is a firm asset, the firm trustee should have all
the normal powers of a bankruptcy trustee to prevent the diminution of that
asset by the partner. But the reasoning of Liberty National Bank v. Bear'1 3
indicates that liens on the individual property of the partners are not affected
104. Section 5c, 30 STAT. 547 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 23c (1934).
105. In re Mitchell, 211 Fed. 778 (S. D. N. Y. 1914); see Meek v. Centre County
Banking Co., 268 U. S. 426, 431 (1925) ; note 83 supra.
106. 228 U. S. 695 (1913).
107. See note 46 supra.
108. See Comment (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1134.
109. Liberty Nat. Bank v. Bear, 276 U. S. 215 (1928); Comment (1929) 29 CoL. L.
REv. 1134.
110. See note 81 supra.
111. See note 98 supra.
112. Armstrong v. Fisher, 224 Fed. 97, 99 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905); Dickas v. Barnes,
140 Fed. 849, 851 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) ; In re Sugar Valley Gin Co., 292 Fed. 508, 509
(N. D. Ga. 1923); Comment (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1134, 1136; 1 COLLIER ON BArN-
RUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.19.
113. 276 U. S. 215 (1928).
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by a firm adjudication. 114 The case has been considered as reaffirming the
entity theory of partnership bankruptcy.1" A sounder view is that although
the policy of full administration of all firm assets requires power of the firm
trustee to set aside liens on the individual property of the partners, Section 5
fails to provide a substitute for the usual basis for this power -individual
adjudication." 6
Section 5 has left unsolved a number of other problems incident to the
administration of the estates of unadjudicated partners. Is such administra-
tion optional to the firm trustee? Or can the firm creditors compel it?"-,
The directions of the statute with regard to the duties of trustees in their
handling of the estates of bankrupts" 8 are of course not directly applicable
to non-bankrupt partners' estates. But the firm trustee should be compelled
to administer all assets of the firm, including the available assets of the
partners; unless he does so, he does not take all action necessary to effective
administration of the firm estate, nor provide the basis for discharge of the
partners from firm debts.119
Again, the Act leaves doubt as to what the firm trustee should do with
the assets determined to be referable to the individual debts of the non-adjudi-
cated partners. Should he return them to the partner or pay them directly
to the creditors? The correct answer seems to be that he should return
such assets to the partners. 2 0 It is desirable that unified administration be
achieved by a joint proceeding which can treat both individual and firm debts.
But the option of using such a proceeding should be left to the partners
or their creditors.' 2 ' The policy of drawing into the firm proceeding the
estates of the partners in all cases seems justified so far as those estates are
relevant to the firm proceeding; in his capacity as partner, liable for the
firm debts, an individual may fairly be said to have abandoned exemption
114. Ibid.; Comment (1928) 41 HAgv. L. RE-. 1044, 1046.
115. Comment (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 179, 180; 1 Coumua ou BAnmwucr
(14th ed. 1940) §5.03.
116. Section 67a(1), 52 STAT. 875, 11 U. S. C. § 107a(1) (Supp. 1938).
117. Some cases consider the administration of the non-adjudicated partners' estates as
compulsory. In re Sugar Valley Gin Co., 292 Fed. 508 (N. D. Ga. 1923); Matter of
Georgalas Bros., 245 Fed. 129 (N. D. Ohio 1917). 1 CoLLM o1 BAzmuprcy (14th ed.
1940) § 5.19, n. 1. The issue, however, is controversial. Compare Comment (1929) 41
HAv. L. REv. 1044, with Comment (1929) 29 COL. L REv. 1134.
118. Section 47, 52 STAT. 860, 11 U. S. C. § 75 (Supp. 1938).
119. W ,ithout full administration, discharge of the partners from firm debts is unjusti-
fied as a matter of policy. See p. 924 infra. Therefore, if administration of the separate
estates of unadjudicated partners is discretionary to the firm trustee, no individual dis-
charge from firm debts could faitly be made without consideration of what the trustee
had done in the particular case. See Comment (1929) 29 CoL I. RE:v. 1134. Of course,
under the Chandler Act, discharge of individual partners from firm debts is never possible
without individual adjudication. § 5j.
120. Comment (1928) 41 HA-v. L. REv. 1044, 1047.
121. Ibid.; Comment (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1134, 1137.
19401
THE KILE LAW JOURNAL
under the Act from bankruptcy. 2 2 But with regard to the individual obli-
gations of the partners, there is no reason why the usual bases of bankruptcy
jurisdiction should not be met.
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of the failure of the 1898 Act to
solve the problems peculiar to partnerships was its lack of provision for the
discharge of the 'partners from the firm debts. The provision of the 1867
Act for discharge of the partners was omitted from the Act of 1898,123 and
most courts held under the latter statute that, upon its general policy, dis-
charge could be predicated only on prior adjudication. 2 4 As a matter of policy
this was again a result of the failure to distinguish between the partners as
individuals and as members of the firm. If the partners' estates are con-
sidered in measuring firm solvency, and the partners themselves submitted
to most of the burdens of bankruptcy through the administration of their
estates in the firm proceeding, 2 5 it is indeed an "incongruity" 1 2 0 to deny a
discharge of firm debts after all firm creditors' rights have been satisfied. A
discharge of the firm "entity," leaving the partners fully liable at law, is a
plain absurdity; and under the doctrine of administration of all separate estates,
there is no reason why the unadjudicated partners should not be granted a
discharge.
Of course, such a discharge should not be granted without full administra-
tion of the individual estates.'2 7 Any provision for individual discharge from
firm debts must therefore be predicated on a solution of the administrative
uncertainties discussed: there should be authority for the firm trustee to deal
adequately with the individual estates, and liens on them; he should be coin-
pelled to administer all the individual estates, and instructed what to do with
the assets not available to firm creditors; and the doubts as to the extent
of application of the McNeal doctrine should be laid at rest. If this were
done, there would be no reason of policy why the "incongruity" should not be
removed; and such holdings as that of a recent case12 8 under the Chandler
Act that the court has a limited jurisdiction over the assets of unadjudicated
partners, but none over rights of action against them, would be avoided.
Some courts under the 1898 Act did, on the basis of the arguments in
the McNeal case, disregard the "technical" objection of lack of individual
122. See Dickas v. Barnes, 140 Fed. 849, 851 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905).
123. Analysis, 26; see p. 909 mipra.
124. Homer v. Hamner, 249 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) ; In re Pincus, 147 Fed.
621 (S. D. N. Y. 1906); Bloyd v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 167 Ark. 644, 268
S. W. 618 (1925); Rowland v. Lovett, 45 Ga. App. 122, 163 S. E. 511 (1932); Win. R.
Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Ford, 146 Ark. 227, 225 S. W. 320 (1920) ; 1 CoLuaE ox BANXI-
RUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.15; see note 125 infra.
125. See Comments (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1134, (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 348.
126. See Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 701 (1913); Comment (1925) 35 YALE
L. J. 362, 365.
127. See Comment (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 1044; note 125 supra.
128. First Nat. Bank of Herkimer v. Poland Union, C. C. A. 2d, Jan. 8, 1940.
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adjudication, and grant discharge from firm debts to unadjudicated part-
ners. 129 But the "technical" objection has a good deal of weight, and it was
the job of the revised statute to supply a statutory basis for the action which
policy so clearly indicated. Instead, the Chandler Act specifically forebade
discharge of the partners without adjudication. 13 0 The provision was inserted
on the theory that it was settled law. 31 This approach seems based on a
fundamental misconception of the function of statutory reform. The "settled"
law was made up of cases based on mistaken and inadequate premisesY 2 Their
analysis was warped by their obsession with the doctrine of firm separateness;
and they were handicapped by the absence of any permission in the act
justifying the grant of a discharge. The Chandler Act has replaced inade-
quacy with forthright prohibition, and codified cases themselves based on
lack of authority.
This codification of the harsh discharge provision is not justified by the
availability of discharge from firm debts on an individual adjudication. The
drafters of the Act themselves ignored a similar argument when they pro-
vided for automatic adjudication of the firm on adjudication of all partners,
and for a quasi-voluntary petition by less than all the partners. In both these
cases, relief was available by more roundabout, cumbersome proceedings.13
Further, the relief provided by a discharge from firm debts on an individual
petition is not equivalent to that gained by discharge of non-adjudicated
partners in a firm proceeding. It requires the partner, whether or not he
has committed an act of bankruptcy, and even if he is exempt under the
statute, to submit all his property to the court, if he is to be discharged from
his firm, debts. There is no justification for so strict a requirement. If the
interests of firm creditors are protected, there is no reason why the court
should force the partner, on pain of a denial of discharge from firm debts, to
submit his individual assets to the court unless he so wishes, or has made
129. Armstrong v. Norris, 247 Fed. 253 (C. C. A. Sth, 1917); Abbott v. Anderson,
265 Ill. 285, 106 N.E. 782 (1914) ; Young v. Stevenson, 73 Ark. 4'0, 48 S. AV. 623 (1905),
overruled sub nor. Bloyd v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 167 Ark. 644, 26S S. A'%
618 (1925).
130. Section 5j, 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23j (Supp. 1938).
131. Analysis, 26.
132. Homer v. Hamner, supra note 124, was the case on which the drafters of the
Chandler Act apparently chiefly relied as "settled" authority for the denial of a discharge.
Analysis, 26-27. The Homer case, however, placed much reliance on In re Berten-
shaw, 157 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), a strict entity theory case which at the time of
the drafting of the Chandler Act had been peacefully buried for a quarter of a century.
See note 48 supra.
133. Jurisdiction to administer the firm property could of course be attained by the
filing of a new petition against the firm. And a partner could get a discharge from firm
debts on a separate voluntary petition. See p. 918 supra; Comment (1938) 87 U. o,
PA. L. REv. 105, 107.
19401
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
himself subject to an individual involuntary petition under the provisions
of the Act pertinent to individuals.
34
There is thus under the present statute little point to the partner's resisting
adjudication even where he could successfully do so. The cases which rule
that any act of bankruptcy for which the firm can be adjudicated allows the
adjudication of all the partners 13 5 achieve, curiously, the result most favor-
able to the partners, since without such adjudication they are denied a dis-
charge from firm debts. Yet these cases fail to draw any distinction between
the rights and liabilities of the partners as individuals and as members of
the firm, and, under a statute which provided an adequate basis for discharge
of the partners from firm debts, could be justly criticized.
It is thus apparent that the method of reform used in the Chandler Act,
though it has eliminated some procedural gaps and uncertainties, has failed
to solve the most important problems of partnership bankruptcy. By
relying heavily on the cases under the old Act, it has preserved the taint
of dialectical controversy over the theoretical separateness of the firm, and
has continued the statutory inadequacies which were responsible for many
of the faults in the decisions. By continuing to rely on the sections of the
Act worked out for individuals, it has failed to give the firm trustee sufficient
authority to deal adequately with the assets of unadjudicated partners, or
the court the power to discharge such partners after the proceeding. There
seems no reason why there should not be provided for the partners and their
assets, so far as they are relevant to the firm proceeding, a machinery separate
from that based on their adjudication as individuals. Such machinery, so fitted
to the rules of partnership law as to make possible the fulfillment of the aims
of bankruptcy - efficient administration, satisfaction of creditors and a new
start for the debtor -the Chandler Act failed to provide. It is to be hoped
that the courts will succeed in avoiding the dialectical controversy which
has clouded so many issues under the old statute, and will devote their energies
to close analysis of the fundamental rules of partnership law in order to
achieve the aims of bankruptcy so far as this is not affirmatively prevented
by the Act. It is unfortunate that the Chandler Act has made this task so
difficult, by attempting to patch a fabric which should have been completely
rewoven.
134. The inconsistencies of the present Act are also illustrated by the curious tactical
dilemma which faces the firm creditor. He might well wish to avoid separate adjudication
of the partners, so as to take the benefits of administration of the assets of partners in the
firm proceeding [see § 5d],-while leaving the partner fully liable for firm debts under § 5j.
But under the doctrine of the Bear case, the creditor may be forced to get separate
adjudications of the partners if he is to prevent liens on their individual estates from
becoming indissoluble.
135. See note 45 supra.
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